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Weighted games for several levels of approval in input and output were introduced in Freixas and Zwicker (2003). The influence relation on the set of voters for games with several levels of approval in input was introduced in Tchantcho, Difo Lambo, Pongou, and Engoulou (2008). However, there are weighted games not being complete for the influence relation, something different to what occurs for simple games. In this work we introduce several extensions of the desirability relation and from the completeness of them it follows the consistent link with weighted games, which solves the existing gap. Moreover, we show that the influence relation is consistent with a known subclass of weighted games: strongly weighted games. Power theories for ternary voting games, or games with abstention, were initiated by Felsenthal and Machover (1997). We support that these theories are consistent for complete games for the influence relation, but for other games other power theories seem to be more appropriate. (Received September 21, 2012)