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Sinan Aksoy, Alexander Adam Azzam, Chaya Coppersmith, Julie Glass, Gizem Karaali* (gizem.karaali@pomona.edu), **Xueying Zhao** and **Xinjing Zhu**. *School Choice as a One-Sided Matching Problem: Cardinal Utilities and Optimization*.

The school choice problem concerns the design and implementation of matching mechanisms that produce school assignments for students within a given public school district. Here, we explore a class of one-sided, cardinal utility maximizing matching mechanisms focused exclusively on student preferences. We adapt a well-known combinatorial optimization technique (the Hungarian algorithm) as the kernel of this class of matching mechanisms. We find that, while such mechanisms can be adapted to meet desirable criteria not met by any previously employed mechanism in the school choice literature, they are not strategyproof. (Received August 24, 2014)