

1023-N1-973

Jeff Buechner* (buechner@rci.rutgers.edu), Department of Philosophy, Conklin Hall, Room 432, 175 University Avenue, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ 07109. *Searle's Metaphysics of Computation and Alternative Logics: A Surprising Connection.*

There is a surprising connection between John Searle's views on the metaphysics of computation and the view that logic is true by convention and that choice of a logic is choice of a convention. I'll develop this connection in some detail, and then show how Quine's argument (in his well-known essay "Truth by Convention") against the view that logic is true by convention and Kripke's (unpublished) arguments against the view that there are alternatives to classical logic can be used to undermine Searle's views. Since Searle's views on the metaphysics of computation underlie triviality arguments—the claim that any object can compute any function—which are devastating to the computational view of the mind, the interest here is in showing that work in the philosophy of mathematics can be usefully employed in the philosophy of mind. (Received September 23, 2006)