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Arrow's theorem rules out the possibility of finding a perfect voting system, so it is important to understand many systems and their properties. In this talk we will present some interesting properties of the dice voting system. In this system each candidate is represented by a die; each side of the die has one voter's Borda score for that candidate. Candidate A is stronger than Candidate B if the probability that Candidate A's die rolls a higher value than Candidate B's is greater than the probability that Candidate B's die rolls a higher value than Candidate A's. This system has many properties in common with the Borda and Condorcet systems without being identical to either. The most interesting property is given an outcome for a set of candidates, the possible outcomes for restrictions in the set of candidates has many of the same relations as the Borda Count. (Received September 15, 2008)