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The school choice mechanism design problem focuses on assignment mechanisms matching students to public schools in a given school district. The well-known Gale-Shapley Student Optimal Stable Matching Mechanism (SOSM) is the most efficient stable mechanism proposed so far as a solution to this problem. However its inefficiency is well-documented. In this note we describe two adjustments to SOSM in order to address this inefficiency. In one we create possibly artificial coalitions among students where some students modify their preference profiles in order to improve the outcome for some other students. Our second approach involves trading cliques among students where those involved improve their assignments by waiving some of their priorities. We also discuss the practical implications and limitations of both approaches. (Received July 28, 2011)