1086-91-1472 **D. Marc Kilgour*** (mkilgour@wlu.ca), Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario N2L3C5, Canada, and **Steven J. Brams** (steven.brams@nyu.edu), Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10012. *When Does Approval Voting Make the "Right Choices"?*

We assume that a voter's approval of a proposal depends on (i) the proposal's probability of being right (or good or just) and (ii) the voter's probability of making a correct judgment about its rightness (or wrongness). The state of a proposal (right or wrong), and the correctness of a voter's judgment about it, are assumed, initially, to be independent. If the average probability that voters are correct in their judgments is greater than $\frac{1}{2}$, then the proposal with the greatest probability of being right will, in expectation, receive the greatest number of approval votes. This result also holds when voters' probabilities of being correct are state dependent but not proposal dependent; when they are functionally related in a certain way; or when voters follow a leader with an above-average probability of correctly judging proposals. Sometimes, however, voters will more frequently select the right proposal by not following a leader and, instead, making their own independent judgments (as assumed by the Condorcet Jury Theorem). Applications of these results to different kinds of voting situations are discussed. (Received September 22, 2012)